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ABSTRACT
American appellate courts have long resisted calls that they play
a more robust role in the sentencing process, insisting that they must
defer to what they characterize as the superior sentencing competence
of trial judges. This position is unfortunate insofar as rigorous
appellate review might advance uniformity and other rule-of-law
values that are threatened by broad trial court discretion. This
Article thus provides the first systematic critique of the appellate
courts’ standard justifications for deferring to trial court sentencing
decisions. For instance, these justifications are shown to be based on
premises that are inconsistent with empirical research on cognition
and decision making. Despite the shortcomings of the standard
justifications, this Article suggests that there is a stronger argument
for deference that is based on the trial judge’s background knowledge
regarding the particular circumstances of the local community and
courthouse. Even the potential benefits of localization, though, do not
clearly outweigh the rule-of-law costs of appellate deference. Thus,
this Article concludes with a proposal for a sliding-scale approach to
deference that strengthens the appellate role, but also accommodates
localization values in the cases in which they are most salient.
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INTRODUCTION
More than thirty-five years ago, Judge Marvin Frankel famously
denounced sentencing in the United States as “law without order.”1
In the absence of clear legal standards governing punishment or
meaningful appellate review, the unchecked discretion of sentencing
judges produced what Frankel characterized as “horrible dispari-
ties”2—“a wild array of sentencing judgments without any sem-
blance of the consistency demanded by the ideal of equal justice.”3
In some states, the criticisms of Frankel and other reformers
resulted in the adoption of binding sentencing guidelines.4 In most
states today, however, sentencing occurs without guidelines or with
unenforceable, advisory guidelines.5 In these states, appellate
review might supply what guidelines do not: a safeguard against
outlier sentences and a source of reassurance that terms of impris-
onment are no longer than demonstrably necessary to advance the
basic purposes of punishment. Yet state appellate courts have,
almost without exception, shied away from these important tasks.6
1. This phrase was the subtitle of Frankel’s influential 1973 book on sentencing. See
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973). For a discussion of
Frankel’s influence, see Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal
Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 759, 762-63 (2006). 
2. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 21.
3. Id. at 7.
4. As of 2004, twenty-one states had presumptive or mandatory guidelines systems.
Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 775, 786 (2008). In 2004, however, the Supreme Court declared such systems
unconstitutional to the extent they relied on judicial fact-finding to determine a presumptive
sentencing range. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004). Blakely prompted five
states to convert their guidelines from presumptive or mandatory to voluntary. Bibas & Klein,
supra, at 785-86.
5. As of 2004, seventeen states had no guidelines, and seven (plus the District of
Columbia) had advisory guidelines. Bibas & Klein, supra note 4, at 785. The Supreme Court’s
Blakely decision has since caused an additional five states to move into this camp. Id. at 785-
86.
6. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.ZZ cmt. k (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007)
(“No state sentencing system with advisory guidelines has yet produced effective appellate-
court scrutiny of trial-court penalties.”). In a forthcoming paper, Professor John Pfaff suggests
that Indiana may be an exception to the general rule of anemic appellate sentence review in
jurisdictions without mandatory sentencing guidelines. John F. Pfaff, The Future of Appellate
Sentencing Review: Booker in the States, 93 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript
at 23, on file with author).
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The extraordinary deference given to sentencing judges doubt-
lessly owes much to the appellate courts’ fear that more robust
review would invite a sharp increase in the number of sentence
appeals.7 But the appellate courts themselves defend deference on
other grounds, chiefly that trial level judges are better positioned to
make good sentencing decisions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
reasoning is typical:
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomi-
tantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the
sentencing court is “in the best position to determine the proper
penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
individual circumstances before it.” Simply stated, the sentenc-
ing court sentences flesh-and-blood defendants and the nuances
of sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold
transcript used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing
court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review,
bringing to its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment
that should not be lightly disturbed.8
Although several scholars have called for more robust appellate
review of sentences,9 the case for deference has not yet been
critically examined on its own terms. Instead, scholars focus on rule-
of-law concerns: high deference means that each sentencing judge
makes his or her own law, and there is no real safeguard against
unwarranted disparities.10 But this criticism does not really address
7. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guidelines Systems and Sentencing Appeals: A Comparison
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1446 (1997).
8. Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Ward, 568 A.2d 1242, 1243 (Pa. 1990)).
9. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 28 (2008) (criticizing appellate deference to policy decisions by
sentencing judges); Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of Law in Federal Guidelines
Sentencing: Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake of Koon v. United States, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1738 (1998) (criticizing “deferential abuse of discretion review”); Reitz,
supra note 7, at 1471, 1480 (criticizing passive role of appellate courts in Pennsylvania’s
sentencing system). The most recent draft of revisions to the Model Penal Code’s sentencing
provisions also calls for “review that is more searching than under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.” MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.ZZ cmt. g, illus. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
10. See, e.g., Hessick & Hessick, supra note 9, at 31-32 (“[L]eaving substantive sentencing
policy to district court discretion ... sacrifice[s] equal treatment and the rule of law.”);
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the basic claim of the appellate courts: that is, deference results in
higher quality sentences that more fully take into account all of the
nuances of each case, a value that Professor Kyron Huigens calls
“fine-grainedness.”11 If deference commonly results in higher quality
sentences in this sense, it is not immediately clear why rule-of-law
values should trump fine-grainedness values (or vice versa, for that
matter). If we grant the appellate courts’ premise that trial courts
are better positioned to make high quality sentencing decisions, we
seem to be at an impasse.
But, in truth, the case for deference is not nearly as strong as the
appellate courts seem to believe. Indeed, psychological research on
cognition and decision making provides reasons to think that
appellate courts may actually be better positioned than trial courts
to make high quality, fine-grained sentencing decisions. For
instance, the appellate judge’s reliance on a “cold transcript” may
actually help by providing insulation from misleading visual cues at
the in-person sentencing hearing.12 On the other hand, moving
beyond the vague and dubious clichés invoked by the appellate
courts, it is possible to imagine one real advantage that trial judges
do have: they are more likely to possess background information not
contained in the formal court record regarding relevant local
circumstances.13 Thus, for instance, trial judges are probably better
positioned than appellate judges to adapt sentences to fit commu-
nity values.14 But localization is not equally appropriate in all cases.
If a defendant’s victims are dispersed across several communities,
Johnson, supra note 9, at 1740-45 (discussing tension between rule-of-law interests and
deferential abuse-of-discretion review); Reitz, supra note 7, at 1471 (identifying disparity as
a dominant concern in Pennsylvania’s system of weak appellate review); Ian Weinstein, The
Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon’s Failure To Recognize the Reshaping
of Judicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 506 (1999) (criticizing
adoption of abuse-of-discretion standard in the federal system as creating situations in which
“outcomes continue to turn on who does the judging”); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing
Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1379 (1999) (criticizing proposal for deferential
“reasonableness review” in the federal system as creating a system in which “[e]ach trial judge
would be free to apply her own chosen principles, in her own reasonable way”).
11. Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1063-64
(2005). 
12. See infra Part II.A.3.
13. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and
Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 103-05 (1997).
14. Id.
2128 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:2123
for example, it might seem arbitrary to select the values of any one
community to control the sentencing decision. 
Once persuasive grounds for appellate deference are identified, it
becomes easier to see that the justification for deference is not
uniformly strong across the board. Thus, a selective, sliding-scale
approach to deference may be an effective way to limit deference to
those cases in which it is actually most likely to contribute to high
quality decisions, while maintaining an emphasis on rule-of-law
values elsewhere.15
In developing these points, this Article proceeds as follows. Part
I identifies in more detail the basic values at stake and takes a first
cut at making the case against deference. Part II critically analyzes
the case that has been made for deference and advances a new
account based on the trial judge’s background knowledge of local
circumstances. Finally, Part III proposes the sliding-scale approach
as preferable to high deference across the board.
Three caveats are in order before proceeding. First, my concern
in this Article is solely with the role of appellate courts in jurisdic-
tions that either employ nonbinding, “advisory” sentencing guide-
lines, or do not have sentencing guidelines at all. A rich body of
scholarly literature addresses the role of appellate courts in policing
guidelines compliance in mandatory jurisdictions.16 However, the
15. A dozen years ago, Professor Cynthia K.Y. Lee proposed a thoughtful sliding-scale
approach for appellate deference in connection with “departure” decisions in the then-
mandatory federal sentencing guidelines system. Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New “Sliding-Scale of
Deference” Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of District Court Departures
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 41-47 (1997). Her approach
emerged from a conclusion, similar to mine, that neither the appellate court nor the trial court
has clear superiority with respect to all aspects of all sentencing decisions. Id. at 34. Her
proposal differs from mine in that hers was directed to the then-mandatory federal system,
while mine is designed for use in nonmandatory systems (which would now include the federal
system). Additionally, her proposal relied on traditional views regarding the relative
competence of trial and appellate courts in deciding questions of law and fact. See, e.g., id. at
44 (“Here, nondeferential review makes sense, because the characterization of a ground for
departure seems to constitute a question of law rather than a question of fact.... [D]istrict
courts are better positioned to evaluate the facts of the case.”). My analysis casts doubt on
these traditional views of relative institutional competence and instead advances the idea that
knowledge of local circumstances supplies the most persuasive argument for superior trial
court competence. 
16. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 167-68 (1998); Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful
Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence That Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21 (2000); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the
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number of states with mandatory guidelines, which has never been
a majority, has actually been declining in recent years,17 and even
the federal system switched from mandatory to advisory in 2005.18
The current trend away from mandatory guidelines makes a
reconsideration of the appellate role in nonmandatory jurisdictions
especially timely.19
Second, my analysis concerns only subconstitutional appellate
review. A considerable amount of scholarly work has been done on
sentence review under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
of the Eighth Amendment.20 At present, however, the governing
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1727-40,
1747-48 (1992); Johnson, supra note 9; Lee, supra note 15; Reitz, supra note 7; Weinstein,
supra note 10.
17. See supra notes 4-5. Excluding the five states with jury sentencing (which presents
a very different set of issues for appellate review than I consider here), the seventeen states
without guidelines, as of late 2008, were Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Bibas & Klein,
supra note 4, at 785 n.44. The twelve states with advisory guidelines were Alabama,
California, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin, as well as the District of Columbia. Id. at 785 n.45, 786 n.48. In June
2009, Wisconsin effectively abandoned even advisory guidelines and should now be counted
among the states without guidelines. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 3386m (removing section
973.017(2)(a) of Wisconsin’s sentencing statute that required judges to consider guidelines).
The analysis of this Article is most immediately relevant to the foregoing twenty-nine states,
the District of Columbia, and the federal system. Of course, given recent trends, it is possible
that additional states will move into this camp in coming years.
18. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
19. The federal system’s recent switch from mandatory to advisory guidelines has
prompted some other recent scholarly work on the appellate role in advisory systems, with
particular attention given to the questions of whether it is appropriate for the federal courts
to give a presumption of reasonableness to sentences within the recommended guidelines
range and whether district judges should be given the authority to reject policy choices
embodied in the federal guidelines. See, e.g., Hessick & Hessick, supra note 9, at 18-28. These
are important questions for the federal system, but not necessarily for other advisory systems.
See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the
Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 37-
38) [hereinafter O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations], available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427489 (comparing federal and Wisconsin
systems). In any event, the present Article addresses the appellate role at a somewhat higher
level of generality. 
20. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, and the
Eighth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149 (2006); Youngjae Lee, International
Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63 (2007);
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to
Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008).
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Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not provide a meaningful
basis for the review of noncapital sentences.21 If appellate review is
to become more robust, the more promising path would appear to be
the courts’ statutory or inherent authority to review trial court
sentencing decisions. 
Third, the Article focuses not on the formal label attached to
appellate review, but on the actual degree of deference accorded
sentencing decisions.22 Most jurisdictions seem to have adopted
“abuse of discretion,” or some slight variation on that terminology,
to describe the formal standard of review for sentences.23 But abuse
of discretion is a notoriously protean standard, which sometimes
involves virtually limitless deference and sometimes almost no
deference.24 I have no quarrel with continued use of “abuse of
discretion” (or any of its close cousins) as the formal standard of
review for sentences; my concern is with the content that is given to
the label—high deference versus low deference.
I. THE CASE AGAINST DEFERENCE: A PRELIMINARY VIEW
Although scholars have largely neglected the question of how
much deference appellate courts should give to trial courts in a
jurisdiction without mandatory guidelines, a sizeable body of work
addresses the parallel question of how much discretion trial court
judges should have in a system with mandatory guidelines.25 In
grappling with this question, different scholars use different
terminology and reach different bottom-line conclusions, but there
is a general consensus as to the fundamental values that are at
21. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (plurality) (upholding sentence
of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting three golf clubs after a challenge on Eighth
Amendment grounds).
22. To be clear, I refer here to what is sometimes called “substantive” appellate review.
I have written elsewhere regarding “procedural” appellate review, particularly review of the
adequacy of the explanation given on the record by the sentencing judge. O’Hear, Appellate
Review of Sentence Explanations, supra note 19; Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences,
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459 (2009).
23. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.ZZ cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); see, e.g.,
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45-46 (2007) (noting that federal standard of review is
abuse of discretion); State v. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Wis. 2004) (noting that Wisconsin
standard of review is erroneous exercise of discretion).
24. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 9, at 16.
25. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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stake. These same values also play an important role in assessing
the appellate role in a nonmandatory system.
The fundamental, competing values may be characterized as
“legality” and “fine-grainedness.”26 Legality refers to those traits
that we commonly associate with the ideal of rule of law.27 These
traits include fair notice of legal norms28 and uniformity in their
application—that is, similar treatment of similar cases.29 From a
defendant’s perspective, legality thus has both ex ante and ex post
dimensions. On the ex ante side, legality values indicate that
prospective offenders should be able to discern their real sentencing
exposure before committing a crime, defendants engaged in plea
bargaining should be able to determine the penal consequences of
accepting a particular plea deal, and convicted defendants (and their
lawyers) preparing for sentencing should be able to figure out how
to tailor their evidence and arguments so as to address what really
matters. Ex post (that is, after sentencing), defendants should be
able to see that their sentences were in line with what other
similarly situated defendants received.
Fine-grainedness refers to a high degree of correlation between
the judgments of a legal system and community views as to just
punishment, taking into account the full range of morally relevant
offense and offender characteristics.30 As Professor Huigens argues,
fine-grainedness seems no less important than legality to the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system: “Given the high stakes
involved, morally credible outcomes are a necessity if we are to
maintain public support for the legal system. No legal system that
routinely punishes morally innocent conduct or that chronically fails
to punish morally guilty conduct can expect to survive in the long
run.”31
26. I borrow these terms from Professor Huigens. Huigens, supra note 11, at 1063-64.
27. Id. at 1063.
28. Id.
29. Although Huigens does not discuss uniformity per se in his definition of legality, other
scholars have associated uniformity with rule-of-law values, see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 9,
at 1745, and that connection seems intuitively correct. Indeed, uniformity seems at least
implicit in the notion of fair notice of legal norms; if norms are not applied in a reasonably
consistent fashion, then actors cannot have fair notice of what is demanded of them.
30. Huigens, supra note 11, at 1064.
31. Id. The invocation of moral right and wrong seemingly connects fine-grainedness to
retributive theories of punishment. Professor Paul Robinson, in particular, has advanced the
argument that the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system rests on the correlation
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The tension between legality and fine-grainedness arises from the
basic legalist impulse to abstract away from the particularities of
specific cases and make decisions based on generic categories—an
analytical process that is apt to cause important case-specific
nuances to become lost in the shuffle. This is not say that legality
and fine-grainedness are wholly incompatible, but it is to suggest
that pushing hard in one direction likely requires trade-offs in the
other. For instance, an emphasis on legality might lead to the
adoption of inflexible mandatory guidelines, but because guideline
drafters cannot possibly hope to account fully for all of the poten-
tially relevant offense and offender characteristics, fine-grainedness
is likely to suffer. Not surprisingly, then, in the guidelines-versus-
judges debate, legality is invoked to support guidelines,32 while fine-
grainedness is invoked to support judicial discretion.33
But how do these values play out in the debate over appellate
deference? The remainder of this Part will develop the basic
argument against high deference based on legality. As for fine-
grainedness, the next Part will show that it does not clearly support
either side in the debate.
In order to see how legality supports the low deference position,
it is helpful to disaggregate the different types of decisions that may
go into the selection of a single sentence. Professors Paul Robinson
and Barbara Spellman have proposed just such a disaggregated
model, which includes six different types of sentencing decisions34:
(1) policymaking—prioritizing among the fundamental, often
between its judgments and public views of desert. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1997). Robinson may or may not be
correct, but nothing in my analysis here depends on a public preference for pure desert over
other approaches to punishment, such as the traditional utilitarian approach. I assume only
that there is some desired range of sentences in any given case that embody a well-informed
application of public values, whatever those values may be, to the particular facts of the case,
and that a fine-grained sentence is one within that range. 
32. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 112-13 (advocating creation of sentencing
guidelines based on rule-of-law concerns).
33. See, e.g., Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1282-83 (1997) (criticizing guidelines on the ground that
justice requires “judgment that takes account of the complexities of the individual case”).
34. Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the
Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1128-29 (2005). I modify their
terminology a bit here in order to avoid confusion later on.
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competing values of the sentencing system;35 (2) policy articula-
tion—translating policy preferences into more specific, categorical
principles about what factors are relevant at sentencing and how
much weight they should be given;36 (3) fact finding—determining
the facts regarding offense and offender that help to establish the
existence (or nonexistence) of particular sentencing factors;37 (4)
judgment-making—making the normative judgments regarding the
facts that help to establish the existence (or nonexistence) of
particular sentencing factors;38 (5) determining punishment amount
—deciding how severe the sentence ought to be;39 and (6) determin-
ing punishment method—deciding how to achieve the desired level
of severity through some appropriate combination of punishment
types, such as incarceration, fine, and supervised release.40
With these different aspects of the sentencing decision in mind,
it becomes easier to see how robust appellate review of sentences
might contribute to legality. Most obviously, the policymaking and
policy articulation decisions present opportunities for appellate
courts to ensure that sentences are imposed according to clear,
uniform principles. Highly deferential appellate review leaves it to
each individual sentencing judge to make his or her own policy
choices. Uniform results seem much less likely if disparate princi-
ples are applied. Fair notice concerns may also be implicated, for
policy articulation decisions establish a shadow criminal code of
sorts. 
By way of illustration, imagine that Judge A decides that drug
dealing in a particular neighborhood beset with drug-related
violence is a highly aggravating sentencing factor: defendants con-
victed of dealing in the neighborhood always receive the maximum
35. These values include the traditionally recognized purposes of punishment (retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), as well as other systemic values such as
uniform treatment of similarly situated offenders and efficient case processing. See id. at
1129.
36. Id. at 1129-30.
37. Id. at 1130.
38. Id. For instance, if a court determines that the leaders of a criminal enterprise should
receive a longer sentence than those with lesser roles (a policy articulation decision), finding
the historic facts about a defendant’s role will still leave a separate, normative decision to be
made regarding whether these facts establish that the defendant had a sufficiently important
position in the enterprise to warrant increased punishment.
39. Id. at 1130-31.
40. Id. at 1131-32.
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sentence from Judge A. Thus, there is a mandatory minimum
sentencing law in effect in Judge A’s courtroom. But how are drug
dealers to obtain notice of this “law”? Trial level sentencing
decisions are not commonly published, and Judge A might or might
not make any effort to publicize the policy decision.41 Moreover,
Judges B, C, and D in the same courthouse may have made a
contrary decision that neighborhood is irrelevant in sentencing drug
offenders. Even if somehow aware of Judge A’s proclivities, a
defendant might still feel that notice of the “mandatory minimum”
was unfair because the odds were low that he would be sentenced in
Judge A’s courtroom. And imagine the defendant’s sense of resent-
ment if a fellow dealer from the same neighborhood, fortunate
enough to be assigned to Judge B’s courtroom, receives a sentence
that is only a fraction the length of his own.
By contrast, in a system with robust appellate review, an
appellate court could ensure that the same policy decisions govern
in every courtroom in a given courthouse. And appellate court
decisions, especially those articulating general rules, are commonly
published, which would also diminish notice concerns.
It is admittedly less obvious that legality has anything to do with
the types of sentencing decisions that are not in the nature of
policymaking or policy articulation. The other sorts of decisions in
the Robinson-Spellman model tend to be case specific and fact
intensive; their resolution seemingly does not lend itself to the
development and articulation of principles of general applicability.
But legality concerns are nonetheless implicated. Although the
specific information considered for sentencing purposes will never
be precisely the same from case to case, similar issues will recur,
and the legality principle indicates that they should be resolved in
similar ways. For instance, whether a member of a drug-trafficking
organization has enough of a leadership role to warrant an en-
hanced sentence will require the weighing of many case-specific
facts, but certain patterns will emerge across cases. Particular
defendants will not have exactly the same sets of responsibilities,
but there will nonetheless seem no good, principled way of distin-
41. In general, judges need provide little by way of explanation of their sentences and
have an incentive to avoid stating their policy decisions because such decisions are most likely
to attract critical attention from appellate courts. Reitz, supra note 7, at 1445-46. 
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guishing their blameworthiness. Whether or not a clear, sensible
rule can be articulated to draw the line between “leaders” and
“followers”—I think probably not42—the legality principle nonethe-
less indicates that similar cases ought to be treated alike. Appellate
courts, by virtue of their smaller numbers of judges and their use of
collegial decision-making processes, seem more likely to ensure such
uniformity than are the trial courts they supervise. Simply put, in
appellate courts, outlier judges are less likely to control outcomes.
Moreover, the decisions of appellate courts become readily available
benchmarks for use by all judges in future cases, thus advancing the
cause of fair notice and diminishing the likelihood of subsequent
disparities in similar cases. I suggest, in other words, that appellate
courts may advance legality values even when they are not acting
in a law-declaration mode. But these values cannot be advanced
effectively if appellate review merely rubber-stamps lower court
decisions.
II. THE CASE FOR DEFERENCE
The previous Part suggested a legality-based argument against
deference. This Part now considers the argument for deference.
First, I summarize and identify weaknesses in the justifications for
deference that have been offered by the appellate courts themselves.
Next, weaving together some of the most promising themes in the
case law and drawing on the concept of localization, I suggest a new
justification for deference. Finally, I show that even this case for
deference does not clearly justify the legality costs.
A. What the Courts Say About Deference
A survey of the sentence review jurisprudence from across all fifty
states and the federal system reveals little systematic explanation
of the deference principle but the repeated invocation of a handful
of loosely related themes. This Section assesses each of these
themes in turn.
42. See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 33, at 1266-67 (discussing complexity of case law
interpreting federal guidelines provision regarding role in the offense). 
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1. There Are No Clearly Correct Answers
One common justification for deference is the indeterminacy of
the legal standards governing sentencing. As the Indiana Supreme
Court stated,
[W]hether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the
day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the
severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
other factors that come to light in a given case. Individual
judgments as to the proper balance to be struck among these
considerations will necessarily vary from person to person, and
judges, whether they sit on trial or appellate benches, are no
exception. There is thus no right answer as to the proper
sentence in any given case. As a result, the role of an appellate
court in reviewing a sentence is unlike its role in reviewing an
appeal for legal error or sufficiency of evidence.43
Other state supreme courts have echoed this point.44
As a justification for giving high deference to sentencing deci-
sions, though, the court’s analysis proves too much. As the saying
goes, we are all legal realists these days,45 and it is now widely
accepted that many “legal” questions reviewed de novo by appellate
43. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
44. See, e.g., State v. Hodari, 996 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Alaska 2000) (“[R]easonable judges,
confronted with identical facts, can and will differ on what constitutes an appropriate
sentence.”); People v. Duran, 533 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo. 1975) (“Sentencing is by its very
nature a discretionary decision and is an art, not a science.” (citation omitted)); State v.
Broadhead, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (Idaho 1991) (“Such determinations [of the length of a term of
confinement] cannot be made with precision.” (quoting State v. Toohill, 650 P.2d 707, 710-11
(Idaho Ct. App. 1983)); State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002) (“The application
of these [sentencing] goals and factors to an individual case, of course, will not always lead
to the same sentence. Yet, this does not mean the choice of one particular sentencing option
over another constitutes error. Instead, it explains the discretionary nature of judging and the
source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.”); State v. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d 197,
209 (Wis. 2004) (“We are mindful that the exercise of [sentencing] discretion does not lend
itself to mathematical precision.”). For a federal case making a similar observation in support
of deference, see United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Sentencing is not,
after all, a precise science. Rarely, if ever, do the pertinent facts dictate one and only one
appropriate sentence. Rather, the facts may frequently point in different directions so that
even experienced district judges may reasonably differ.” (citation omitted)).
45. See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915, 1917 (2005) (“[I]t is often said—indeed so often said that it has become a cliché to
call it a ‘cliché’—that we are all realists now.” (footnote omitted)).
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courts lack objectively correct answers.46 If indeterminacy alone
were the criterion, it is not clear whether any decisions would be
reviewed nondeferentially.47 Observing the indeterminacy of
sentencing standards cannot end the analysis; rather, it begs the
question of whether sentencing questions are the sorts of indetermi-
nate questions as to which legality values indicate that appellate
courts should seek to ensure uniform answers, or whether there are
other competing values that outweigh legality concerns.
Indeed, the indeterminacy point is question-begging at an even
more fundamental level, for indeterminacy could be seen as less an
explanation for deference than a result of deference. Although
statutory sentencing standards may be highly indeterminate,
appellate courts could, in interpreting and applying those stan-
dards, develop rules that are much less indeterminate. The courts
could create rules similar to the vague constitutional standard
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, which has spawned
a host of far more specific legal rules through judicial processes akin
to the development of the common law.48 But such processes seem
unlikely in the sentencing area as long as appellate courts remain
so deferential to sentencing judges.49 Again, we are left to wonder
what countervailing values warrant the cost in legality.
2. Trial Judges Have More Experience
If indeterminacy alone does not provide a satisfactory basis for
distinguishing sentencing from constitutional interpretation and
other sorts of “legal” decisions traditionally reviewed de novo,
then some additional justification must be offered for deference.
Typically, the additional justification sounds in competence:
appellate judges should defer because trial judges will tend to arrive
46. See Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 321
n.57 (2009) (“[T]he fact that law declaration is now regarded as one of the twin functions of
appellate courts stands as evidence of broad acceptance of the proposition that law is
‘underdeterminate.’”).
47. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that police may conduct
search incident to arrest without probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (holding
that police may stop and frisk without probable cause).
49. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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at better answers.50 This Section considers the first of three grounds
that are offered for this conclusion—experience. The other two
grounds, relating to demeanor evidence and fine-grainedness, are
considered in the next two Sections.
Experience played an important role, for instance, in the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. United States, in which
the Court overturned the Eighth Circuit’s appellate review standard
for sentences as insufficiently deferential.51 The Court observed that
“[d]istrict courts have an institutional advantage over appellate
courts in making these sorts of determinations [about whether to go
outside the range recommended by the sentencing guidelines],
especially as they see so many more Guidelines sentences than
appellate courts do.”52 The Court noted that district judges sentence
an average of 117 defendants per year, with only a small fraction of
the sentences being appealed.53 The imbalance between sentences
imposed and sentences appealed likely means that the average trial
judge sees a greater number and diversity of sentencing fact
patterns in any given year than the average appellate judge.
But does this really translate into superior decision-making
competence? Although the United States Supreme Court is not
alone in suggesting as much, there are good reasons to doubt this
conclusion.54 For one thing, it is misleading to simply compare the
50. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
51. 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (rejecting the “Court of Appeals’ rule requiring ‘proportional’
justifications for departures from the Guidelines range”).
52. Id. at 52 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996)).
53. Id. at 52 n.7 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, 2006 FEDERAL COURT
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 167).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he sentencing
court possesses a number of institutional advantages, including ... the cumulative experience
garnered through the sheer number of district court sentencing proceedings that take place
day by day.” (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52)); United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 170-71 (2d
Cir. 2008) (identifying, as institutional advantage of sentencing courts, that they “impose
scores of sentences each year” (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52)); United States v. Poynter, 495
F.3d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 2007) (“And unlike the trial court, most appellate judges have little
experience sentencing individuals. While trial judges sentence individuals face to face for a
living, we review transcripts for a living.”); People v. Babcock, 666 N.W.2d 231, 243 (Mich.
2003) (“Because of the trial court’s ... experience in sentencing, the trial court is better
situated than the appellate court to determine whether a [sentencing] departure is warranted
in a particular case.”); Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007) (“[T]he
sentencing court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to its
decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should not be lightly disturbed.”).
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annual number of sentencing cases seen by trial and appellate
judges, at least if the idea is to suggest that trial judges have
available a greater storehouse of knowledge regarding other
criminal cases. Many appellate judges have prior experience as trial
judges or criminal lawyers. For instance, among the eleven active
judges of the Eighth Circuit, from which Gall emerged, seven have
served either as trial court judges or as prosecutors.55 Moreover,
appellate judges, unlike trial judges, are not limited to their own
personal knowledge in deciding cases, but can also draw on the
experience of two co-panelists or even more than that on a supreme
court.56 The collective experience with criminal cases on any given
appellate panel may match or exceed the individual experience of
many trial judges.57 Additionally, it seems likely that there are
diminishing marginal returns from experience. Once a judge has
seen her first fifty drug cases, it is not at all clear whether the
second fifty will add anything helpful to the judge’s storehouse of
knowledge.58
But perhaps there is something about the experience point that
goes beyond the availability of knowledge. Perhaps sentencing is a
skill that must be practiced regularly in order to achieve the best
results. It is commonly said, for instance, that professional athletes
get “rusty” when they do not play regularly; perhaps appellate
judges suffer a similar disability when they do not have a steady
flow of sentences to review. 
On the other hand, it is not clear why one would become a better
sentencer with regular practice or become a worse sentencer by
doing it less frequently. After all, sentencing is not an activity for
which there is effective feedback.59 Athletes get immediate feedback
on the quality of their performance—they get a hit or they strike
55. According to biographical information available through the Federal Judicial Center’s
website, three Eighth Circuit judges (Murphy, Melloy, and Shepherd) have trial-level judicial
experience, while four (Wollman, Bye, Colloton, and Gruender) have prosecutorial experience.
Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/
home.nsf/hisj (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) (type in judge’s name in the white search box name
for a description of the judge’s professional experience).
56. Cf. Oldfather, supra note 46, at 329-30 (explaining role of panels).
57. Id.
58. See Barbara A. Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in Evaluating
Evidence, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 1, 7 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/
03-2007/Spellman.pdf.
59. Id.
2140 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:2123
out, they make the shot or not, they complete the pass or throw an
interception—and they are able to make adjustments based on that
feedback. But how is a sentencing judge to know whether he or she
is performing well? The basic feedback mechanism within the
judicial branch is supplied by appellate review, but high deference
undermines the effectiveness of that feedback. Elected judges may
also receive occasional feedback from the political system, but voters
generally do not have access to anything more than anecdotal
information about the sentencing practices of individual judges.60 In
short, there is no apparent reason to think that sentencing is the
sort of activity that lends itself to the development of expertise
through regular practice.61
In the end, the experience point seems no less question-begging
than the indeterminacy point. If appellate judges are less competent
because they see fewer sentencing cases, they could surely increase
their number of sentencing cases by adopting standards of review
that are more friendly to appellants. And, even as matters now
stand, it is not clear that appellate judges see a materially smaller
proportion of sentencing issues than they do any other type of issue.
Given high settlement rates across the board in civil and criminal
cases, trial judges likely address all types of issues, and not just
sentencing issues, with greater frequency than appellate judges—
including those types of “legal” issues that are traditionally
reviewed de novo. In short, we still lack a convincing basis for dis-
tinguishing sentencing decisions from those that are accorded much
less appellate deference.
60. Judges may also get feedback of a sort when a light sentence is imposed on a
defendant and that defendant turns around and commits another crime; this may signal that
the judge should have imposed a more severe sentence in the first place for incapacitation or
specific deterrence purposes. This is an unsatisfactory feedback mechanism, though, because
it is unsystematic. New crimes may or may not come to the judge’s attention, particularly in
a multimember trial court in which the new case may be assigned to a different judge. This
mechanism is also asymmetric because the judge will get negative feedback on unduly lenient
sentences, but not on unduly harsh sentences. 
61. Cf. Spellman, supra note 58, at 7 (“[E]xpertise develops out of ‘many thousands of
hours of specific types of practice and training’ — a process called ‘deliberate practice.’
Deliberate practice requires focused programmatic study. It includes appropriate feedback
about performance. It includes identifying errors and working on procedures to eliminate
them.... And trial judges can sit through hundreds of cases and never do the focused study or
have the fast reliable feedback necessary for developing expertise.” (citation omitted)).
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3. Trial Judges Have Access to Demeanor Evidence
 It is said that “the role of demeanor in assessing witness
credibility provides one of the standard, and oldest, justifications for
appellate deference to lower court fact finding.”62 This general
observation holds true in the sentencing context, with appellate
courts frequently citing the face-to-face contact between sentencing
judge and defendant as a basis for deference.63 Although the courts
tend to focus on the importance of the defendant’s demeanor in
particular, it has been suggested that the demeanor of other
witnesses and parties may also be useful in selecting a sentence.64
Recalling the different types of decisions that go into the selection
of a sentence, demeanor evidence seems most clearly related to fact-
62. Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
2557, 2559 (2008).
63. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007) (“‘The sentencing judge has
access to, and greater familiarity with, ... the individual defendant before him than the ...
appeals court.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2008)
(identifying that they “hear all the evidence relevant to sentencing, make credibility
determinations, and interact directly with the defendant” as institutional advantages of
sentencing courts (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51)); People v. Duran, 533 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo.
1975) (“In our view, the appellate court is always at a disadvantage because of the fact that
it does not have the benefit of the trial court’s contact with the defendant, which is material
and relevant in every case.”); People v. Stacey, 737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ill. 2000) (“The trial judge
has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility [and] demeanor.”);
State v. Favela, 911 P.2d 792, 810 (Kan. 1996) (“Thus, deference should be granted to the
sentencing judge, who has had first-hand experience with the defendant.”); People v. Babcock,
666 N.W.2d 231, 268 (Mich. 2003) (“It is clear that the Legislature has imposed on the trial
court the responsibility of making difficult decisions concerning criminal sentencing, largely
on the basis of what has taken place in its direct observation.” (emphasis added)); State v.
Riley, 497 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Neb. 1993) (“The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a
subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s
demeanor and attitude.”); State v. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Wis. 2004) (“‘[S]entencing
decisions of the circuit court are generally afforded a strong presumption of reasonability
because the circuit court is best suited to consider the ... demeanor of the convicted
defendant.’” (citation omitted)).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he sentencing
court possesses a number of institutional advantages, including ... the opportunity to see and
hear the principals and the testimony at first hand.”); United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349,
351 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Unlike the trial court, we did not see the defendant, the victims or family
members testify at the sentencing hearing.”); State v. Ahearn, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697 (N.C. 1983)
(“The Fair Sentencing Act was not intended, however, to remove all discretion from our able
trial judges. The trial judge should be permitted wide latitude in arriving at the truth as the
existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, for it is only he who observes the
demeanor of the witnesses and hears the testimony.”).
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finding decisions, which often require credibility determinations.
There seems no good reason, however, why the sentencing judge’s
access to demeanor evidence should result in deference to other
sorts of decisions such as those of the policymaking or policy
articulation variety. If it is thought important to defer to demeanor-
based decisions, then sentencing judges could be asked to identify
their findings of fact separately, as is required, for instance, by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) in connection with civil bench
trials. Appellate courts might be required to accept these findings
as true (unless clearly erroneous), but still have a free hand to
reevaluate the significance of the findings. Indeed, deference might
be even more narrowly granted to findings expressly based on
demeanor evaluation. Because hearsay is permitted for sentencing
purposes,65 important sentencing facts are often found based on
written submissions alone; the availability of demeanor evidence
provides no apparent justification for appellate deference to
decisions of that type.
More importantly, though, the longstanding view that demeanor
evidence results in better decision making flies in the face of an
emerging consensus in the legal and social science literature that
people generally do a poor job in evaluating demeanor evidence.66
Studies suggest, for instance, that lies are accurately detected by
observers only about half the time.67 Indeed, when confronted with
demeanor evidence, test subjects consistently focus on the wrong
cues: “People generally believe[ ] that a reduction in smiling, an in-
crease in furtive glances, fidgeting, and gaze avoidance indicate[ ]
that [a] witness [is] lying. In fact, none of these beliefs [has] support
in the social science literature.”68 Moreover, because of their
tendency to focus on these unreliable visual cues, subjects who
watch witnesses speaking are less accurate in detecting lies than
those who read a transcript after the fact.69 This suggests that, if
anything, appellate judges might do a better job of fact-finding than
65. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949).
66. Minzner, supra note 62, at 2557.
67. Id. at 2561.
68. Id. at 2562 (citing Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The
Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1194
(1993)).
69. Id. (citing Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1086-87
(1991)).
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trial judges precisely because they do not have access to demeanor
evidence.70
To be sure, much of the research on demeanor evidence has
involved lay test subjects in experimental settings, and trial judges
operating in a courtroom might do better. But the research to date
has found little evidence that those who might be thought lie
detection “experts,” such as law enforcement officers, forensic psy-
chiatrists, lawyers, and judges, perform much better than laypeople
in experimental settings.71 Moreover, as Professor Chad Oldfather
observes, the commentators who have assessed the transferability
of the experimental results to the courtroom setting have “uniformly
concluded” that the courtroom setting is unlikely to produce sub-
stantially better results, and may actually worsen the problem.72
Although lie detection is the task most commonly associated with
demeanor evidence, it is possible that such evidence is also used for
a slightly different fact-finding task at sentencing: not just deciding
between competing versions of historical fact, but also determining
the defendant’s current emotional state with respect to the offense.
And, indeed, some of the cases do suggest that demeanor evidence
may be relevant at sentencing for purposes of remorse detection.73
70. In making a similar point regarding appellate deference generally, Professor Chad
Oldfather has helpfully elaborated the advantages of fact-finding based on a transcript. Chad
M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 437, 451-57 (2004). First, courtroom testimony “is present only for an instant, then
disappears,” id. at 451, while testimony on the printed page can be reread and reconsidered
in light of subsequent testimony, id. at 455. Second, “oral language encourages an intuitive
and emotional thought process in its hearers.” Id. at 453. Relatedly, “limitations on human
ability to hold orally communicated information in memory impair the ability to process the
information in an intellectually complex fashion.” Id. at 454. Finally, use of a transcript helps
the appellate court to avoid the pitfall of focusing on unreliable visual cues. Id. at 454, 457-58.
71. Id. at 458. It is not surprising that experience in viewing demeanor evidence does not
translate into expertise in evaluating it, for true expertise emerges from what psychologists
call “deliberate practice,” which includes focused study and feedback on performance.
Spellman, supra note 58, at 7. It is not clear how sentencing judges would get the sort of
feedback necessary to make them better at evaluating demeanor evidence.
72. Oldfather, supra note 70, at 458-59. Oldfather highlights cross-examination as a
potentially important problem in the courtroom setting. See id. at 459 (“Cross-examination
may have a further distorting effect both because of the typically suspicious tone of the
questioning, which has been shown to create a suspicious mindset in observers, and the stress
caused in the witness, which may lead her to give off the sorts of behavioral cues that
observers improperly associate with deception.”).
73. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 613 A.2d 587, 591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (en banc)
(noting superior position of sentencing judge to “view the defendant’s ... displays of remorse,
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It is commonly said that genuine contrition is, to quote the United
States Sentencing Commission, “a sound indicator of rehabilita-
tibe [sic] potential.”74 If so, and if the trial judge’s access to de-
meanor evidence offered remorse detection advantages, then trial
judges might be better positioned than appellate judges to deter-
mine recidivism risk.75
But those are both big “ifs.” Despite the conventional wisdom that
present feelings of remorse predict future desistance from crime,
very little research has been done to substantiate the remorse-
recidivism connection.76 To be sure, psychologists recognize that a
person’s feelings of guilt regarding something he or she has done
tend to induce pro-social behavior (such as efforts to repair the harm
the person has caused77) and that the discomfort of such guilty
feelings may inhibit future transgressions.78 There is also evidence
that a person’s “proneness ... to guilt” is associated with more con-
structive responses to anger and interpersonal conflict.79 But it is far
from clear that the emotion that sentencing judges characterize as
“remorse” or “contrition” is the same (or at least has the same
behavioral consequences) as the emotion that psychologists label
defiance or indifference”), quoted in Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007).
74. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § B321 cmt. (Preliminary Draft 1986) (1986), reprinted
in 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080, 35,116 (Oct. 1, 1986).
75. In addition to advancing the utilitarian goal of addressing recidivism risks effectively,
remorse detection might also have a role to play in retributive approaches to punishment.
More specifically, the emotional suffering that a defendant experiences as a result of remorse
may diminish the need for externally imposed punishment in order to achieve the retributive
goal of just deserts. Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity,
and Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291,
291 (2000). 
76. Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, What Have We Learned from Five Decades of
Neutralization Research, 32 CRIME & JUST. 221, 256 n.15 (2005).
77. Rob M.A. Nelissen & Marcel Zeelenberg, When Guilt Evokes Self-Punishment:
Evidence for the Existence of a Dobby Effect, 9 EMOTION 118, 118 (2009).
78. Grazyna Kochanska et al., Guilt and Effortful Control: Two Mechanisms That Prevent
Disruptive Developmental Trajectories, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 322 (2009).
To be more precise, guilt may be an important check on antisocial conduct for individuals who
have diminished capacity to exercise deliberate, “effortful control” over their conduct. Id. at
330.
79. June Price Tangney et al., Relation of Shame and Guilt to Constructive Versus
Disruptive Responses to Anger Across the Lifespan, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797,
806 (1996).
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“guilt,” as opposed, for instance, to such emotions as shame and
embarrassment, with which guilt is often confused.80
The potential conflation of shame and guilt is particularly
problematic: “When shamed, a person’s focal concern is with the
entire self. Some negative behavior or failure is taken as a reflection
of a more global and enduring defect of the self.”81 When experienc-
ing guilt, by contrast, “a person’s focal concern is with a specific
behavior or failure, somewhat apart from the global self.”82 Much
research indicates that shame and guilt have quite different
implications for psychological functioning, whether considered as
states at a particular moment in time or as traits (proneness to guilt
versus proneness to shame).83 For instance, a recent review of the
literature found a “strong, empirically grounded consensus” that
“shame-prone individuals are more likely to feel anger and to
manage their anger in an unconstructive fashion.”84 Whatever may
be plausibly hypothesized about a link between guilt and low
recidivism risk, it seems unlikely that shame would have the same
relationship to recidivism. Yet, the guilt-shame distinction is fre-
quently overlooked even in clinical settings,85 and the two emotions
are often confused or treated interchangeably.86 Confounding mat-
ters, guilt and shame are often experienced at the same time, or are
felt sequentially with respect to the same incident.87 The positive
psychological associations with guilt and guilt-proneness seem to
manifest themselves only when guilt is not accompanied by shame;
thus, the particular emotional state that seems of greatest relevance
80. See June Price Tangney et al., Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct
Emotions?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1256, 1256 (1996) (“[B]oth psychologists and
laypeople may find it difficult to differentiate these three types of affective experiences.”).
Another similar, but distinguishable, emotional state is regret. Marcel Zeelenberg & Seger
M. Breugelmans, The Role of Interpersonal Harm in Distinguishing Regret from Guilt, 8
EMOTION 589, 589 (2008). 
81. Tangney et al., supra note 79, at 797.
82. Id. at 798.
83. Id.
84. Raffaele Rodogno, Shame and Guilt in Restorative Justice, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 142, 155 (2008). 
85. Tangney et al., supra note 79, at 807.
86. Jeffery S. Ashby et al., Psychologists’ Labeling of the Affective States of Shame and of
Guilt, 34 PSYCHOTHERAPY 58, 59 (1997).
87. Tangney et al., supra note 79, at 801.
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to sentencing would be what psychologists call “shame-free guilt.”88
There is no reason, however, to think that sentencing judges are
consistently seeking out this specific and hard-to-identify emotional
state when they are looking for remorse.
Moreover, even assuming that remorse reliably predicts recidi-
vism risk, there are good reasons to doubt that demeanor evidence
actually contributes much to successful remorse detection. Critics
have long expressed doubt about the capacity of trial judges to
distinguish between genuinely felt and purely self-serving expres-
sions of remorse at sentencing.89 Although some research suggests
that emotional states can be accurately determined by “reading” the
expressions on a person’s face, this is a skill that may require
considerable training and practice.90 Moreover, it seems likely that
88. See id. (discussing distinction between “shame-free guilt and guilt-free shame”). To
be sure, under the retributive justification for taking remorse into account, supra note 75, it
might be argued that any painful emotional state, including shame, would suffice to
accomplish the punitive objectives. On the other hand, shame may be too powerful a negative
emotion to advance retributive ends effectively; shame typically triggers strong avoidance
responses, including blame-externalization and other-directed anger. Tangney et al., supra
note 79, at 806. The instability of shame as an emotional state would seem to make it difficult
to fit into the just deserts scheme. A possibly related problem with the “retributive remorse”
theory is the difficulty of accurate affective forecasting: a considerable body of research now
shows that negative emotions tend to be considerably less durable than is commonly
supposed, even in response to seemingly major traumas like the death of a spouse. Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155,
166-72 (2005) (summarizing studies). As Professor Jeremy Blumenthal concludes, “On
average, we are poor at predicting important elements of future emotional experiences,
whether our own or another’s, even minutes into the future.” Id. at 172. He explains these
results, in part, by reference to the “‘psychological immune system—a system of cognitive
mechanisms that transforms our mental representations of negative events so that they give
rise to more positive emotions.’” Id. at 175-76 (quoting Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Trouble
with Vronsky: Impact Bias in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in THE WISDOM IN
FEELING 114, 124 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002)). In any event, for
present purposes, the point is that even the most keenly felt sense of shame (or any other
negative emotion) at sentencing might moderate with surprising swiftness afterwards,
perhaps greatly diminishing its usefulness from a retributive standpoint.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974); Michael M.
O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”: The Structure,
Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 1507, 1554-56 (1997) [hereinafter O’Hear, Remorse].
90. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 238-39
(2005). Compare, for instance, the picture of a single, untrained judge attempting to discern
emotions from a defendant’s in-court performance with the way emotional states are studied
by academic researchers: subjects are videotaped (which permits repeat viewing), trained
teams of coders seek to identify specific responses from the videotapes, and reliability is
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the reliance on misleading visual cues that impair lie detection
would also to some extent impair remorse detection; indeed, the
remorse detection task may be conceived of as determining whether
the defendant is lying when he says “I’m sorry” or “I accept responsi-
bility.” Finally, the practice of rewarding seemingly “genuine”
remorse may create unwarranted disparities by benefitting the
savvy repeat player (who knows what to say and how to act in the
courtroom), while disadvantaging first-timers, the poorly counseled,
the mentally ill, the young, the poor, and members of racial and
ethnic minority groups.91
The latter consideration points to a more general problem with
the use of demeanor evidence at sentencing for any purpose: the risk
that demeanor assessments will be infected by racial bias and will
exacerbate the racial disparities that already plague the criminal
justice system.92 Mock jury experiments indicate that the same
prosecution evidence is found more convincing and longer sentences
are recommended when the defendant is black than when the
defendant is white,93 which is consistent with well documented
racial disparities in sentence lengths that do not seem attributable
to differences in offense severity or criminal history.94 Although the
psychological research has not focused on cross-racial lie detection
or remorse detection per se, there is some evidence that cross-
cultural lie detection is less accurate,95 and there are reasons to
think that the same phenomenon would be observed in cross-racial
settings.96 Professor Joseph Rand has thus suggested the existence
of a “Demeanor Gap” between the races.97 
quantitatively assessed across teams of coders. See, e.g., Kochanska et al., supra note 78, at
323-24 (discussing coding processes and reliability data from one series of studies on guilt).
91. O’Hear, Remorse, supra note 89, at 1548-53, 1555.
92. See Michael M. O’Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to
Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 466-67, 473-77 (2009) [hereinafter O’Hear,
Rethinking Drug Courts] (discussing magnitude and harmfulness of racial disparities).
93. See Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of Ignorance, 41
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 373, 393-94 (2005) (summarizing studies).
94. For a discussion of the relevant research, see O’Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts, supra
note 92, at 466-72.
95. Pager, supra note 93, at 397 (citing Charles F. Bond, Jr. et al., Lie Detection Across
Cultures, 14 NONVERBAL BEHAV. 189 (1990)).
96. Id. at 397-400.
97. Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2000).
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Unconscious group bias likely contributes to these disparities.98
However, negative racial stereotypes are less likely to influence
decisions if race is unknown, less salient, or discovered only after
the processing of other, more relevant information.99 Dr. Chet Pager
has thus proposed that witnesses testify in court behind screens
that would disguise their race.100 But note that appellate courts
already have the functional equivalent of Pager’s screen: they do not
see defendants, but only read about them through the printed
sentencing record. It is possible, of course, that appellate courts will
discover the defendant’s race through the record—it might be noted,
for instance, in reports prepared by police or probation officers, or
otherwise be evident from the defendant’s transcribed testi-
mony—but, as Pager suggests, it may matter not only whether a
decision maker knows the defendant’s race, but also when and how
race is discovered. Thus, there may be a real difference between
being confronted face-to-face by a defendant of another race at the
start of the sentencing hearing and learning about the defendant’s
race as a more abstract datum after other, more relevant informa-
tion has already been reviewed.101
In sum, whether the fact-finding task is lie detection or remorse
detection, access to in-court visual cues (including demeanor and
race) seems about as likely to lead the trial judge astray as to
facilitate good decision making. Thus, the appellate judge’s neces-
98. Pager, supra note 93, at 401-11.
99. See id. at 432.
100. Id. at 375. Although this may sound like a dramatic and unlikely departure from
tradition, Malcolm Gladwell reports that a similar revolution has occurred in orchestra
auditions in the past thirty years, with screens now commonly being used to shield the
identities of auditioning musicians. GLADWELL, supra note 90, at 250. During that time
period, the number of women in major U.S. orchestras has increased fivefold, id., which
suggests that screening may be a powerful way of reducing the effect of bias in decision
making.
101. See Pager, supra note 93, at 431 (noting that “[w]hen actually faced with a black
witness, the effect on stereotype activation is stronger than merely knowing the witness’ race
as a separate fact”). Appellate judges are also shielded from the full emotional effect of victim
impact evidence. Although the use of victim impact evidence at sentencing has generated
concerns that the emotions elicited by such evidence may distort decision making, the
psychological research is equivocal and still at a preliminary stage. For a recent summary of
the relevant literature, see Bryan Myers et al., Psychology Weighs in on the Debate
Surrounding Victim Impact Statements and Capital Sentencing: Are Emotional Jurors Really
Irrational?, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 13 (2006).
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sary reliance on a transcript may be less a limitation than a source
of institutional advantage.
4. Sentencing Requires Fine-Grained Judgment
The complexity of the sentencing decision provides a final theme
that is prominent in the appellate courts’ discussion of deference.
The Maryland high court, for instance, observed, “A criminal
sentencing decision is never one easily made, and involves a
plethora of considerations, both obvious and subtle. Thus it would
be illogical to conduct any review of a sentence using stringent and
rigid standards.”102 Other appellate courts around the country have
made similar statements.103 Such observations echo the “no clear
right answer” theme discussed above, but may be advancing an
analytically distinct point: it is not so much that sentencing
standards are indeterminate per se, but that applying them is
difficult work (an “arduous task,” as the Iowa Supreme Court put
it104) and involves the weighing of “case-specific detailed factual
circumstances.”105 In other words, the courts seem to be connecting
the “fine-grainedness” of good sentencing decisions to appellate
deference.
It does seem clear enough that the appellate courts reduce the
arduousness of their own work by reviewing fine-grained decisions
deferentially. What is less clear is why this justifies deference. After
all, if reducing workload was always an overriding consideration,
appellate courts would review everything deferentially; but they do
not do so.
102. Thomas v. State, 634 A.2d 1, 7 (Md. 1993).
103. See, e.g., People v. Duran, 533 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo. 1975) (en banc) (“The trial judge
must balance the many facets which enter into a sentencing decision to achieve a result which
protects the rights of society and the defendant.”); State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725
(Iowa 2002) (referring to the “host of factors that weigh in on the often arduous task of
sentencing a criminal offender, including the nature of the offense, the attending
circumstances, the age, character, and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform”
(citation omitted)); People v. Babcock, 666 N.W.2d 231, 243 (Mich. 2003) (“It is clear that the
Legislature has imposed on the trial court the responsibility of making difficult decisions
concerning criminal sentencing .... [T]he question at issue grows out of, and is bounded by,
case-specific detailed factual circumstances.”).
104. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.
105. Babcock, 666 N.W.2d at 243 (quoting Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 65 (2001)).
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Lurking in the background may be a vision of specialization and
comparative expertise: trial courts concentrate on fine-grained
decisions that involve weighing many case-specific facts, while
appellate courts specialize in what the Michigan Supreme Court
terms “recurring, purely legal matter[s]” and “question[s] readily
resolved by reference to general legal principles and standards
alone.”106 Such an argument from comparative expertise features
prominently in the assessment of appellate standards of review
more generally.107
But the argument, although familiar, rings hollow in a number of
respects. I have already questioned, for instance, whether the sort
of feedback mechanisms exist that would allow for the development
of true sentencing expertise among trial judges.108 Moreover, to the
extent there is any comparative advantage in making fine-grained
decisions, the advantage may well lie with appellate courts because
they employ group decision-making procedures. The psychological
research on decision making indicates that groups are better than
individuals at taking multiple factors into account.109
Even granting the dubious assumption that trial court judges
have an expertise that permits them to make higher quality fine-
grained decisions than appellate courts, deference would most
clearly be justified only as to decisions that are, in fact, fine-grained.
Yet, as Robinson and Spellman suggest in their model of sentencing
decisions, the selection of a sentence within a discretionary regime
may involve policymaking and policy articulation decisions, to which
deference would not be justified.110 Moreover, even as to the more
case-specific aspects of the sentencing decision, it is not clear that
trial courts actually routinely engage in a nuanced balancing of the
plethora of potential considerations, as opposed to employing quick,
“rough justice” calculations based on instinctive responses to a small
number of variables. Indeed, experience in busy urban courtrooms
106. Id. (quoting Buford, 532 U.S. at 65).
107. Oldfather, supra note 46, at 327.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
109. Robinson & Spellman, supra note 34, at 1146 (citing Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, The
Impact of Information on Small Group Choice, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 132, 139
(1997)). As Oldfather has observed, however, the premise that multiple judges participate
meaningfully in each appellate decision may have less truth today than in an era of smaller
dockets. Oldfather, supra note 46, at 329. 
110. Robinson & Spellman, supra note 34, at 1146.
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suggests that the rough justice approach may, if anything, be more
typical in practice.111 An ideal of fine-grainedness, no matter how
attractive in theory, seems a poor justification for across-the-board
appellate deference if the ideal is not commonly achieved in
practice.
5. Sentencing in a Blink
In his 2005 best-seller Blink: The Power of Thinking Without
Thinking, journalist Malcolm Gladwell popularized the notion
that quick, intuitive judgments are often a better basis for decision
making than lengthier, more deliberate judgments.112 Although
no appellate courts have yet invoked Blink as a basis for deference
to sentencing decisions, the courts’ characterization of sentencing as
indeterminate113 and complex114 might suggest to some an inchoate
view that deliberation can do little to improve the quality of
sentencing decisions relative to intuition. Indeed, perhaps good
sentencing decisions are so dependent on inarticulable factors that
the more deliberative processes associated with appellate decision
making, especially the generation of formal written opinions
through a collegial drafting and editing process, actually put
appellate courts at a disadvantage relative to trial courts. One could
thus imagine a justification for appellate deference grounded on the
view that trial courts are better able to harness what Gladwell calls
the “power of thinking without thinking.”115
Even Gladwell recognizes, however, that intuitive judgments
are often led astray by superficial appearances,116 including race,117
and that the ability to make consistently good snap judgments
requires training. As he puts it, we must “manage and educate [our]
111. See, e.g., STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 39 (2005) (noting the speedy disposition of cases in a Chicago criminal
courtroom and describing one case in which a total of fifteen minutes was spent on accepting
a plea and determining a sentence). 
112. GLADWELL, supra note 90, at 16-17; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2007).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
114. See supra text accompanying note 8.
115. GLADWELL, supra note 90.
116. Id. at 72-98.
117. Id. at 77-86.
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unconscious reactions.”118 In light of these limitations, Professor
Chris Guthrie and his coauthors have argued persuasively that
judging should not be left to purely intuitive approaches.119 Their
general arguments seem to carry over to sentencing;120 indeed, the
arguments closely echo criticisms made above regarding exper-
ience-121 and demeanor-based122 justifications for appellate defer-
ence. First, Guthrie and his colleagues argue, “intuition is the likely
pathway by which undesirable influences, like race, gender, or
attractiveness of parties, affect the legal system.”123 Concerns re-
garding racial bias, of course, have a particular salience in criminal
cases.124 Second, “judges are unlikely to obtain [the] accurate and
reliable feedback” on their decisions that is necessary to improve the
quality of their intuitive judgments.125 
Moreover, in addition to such concerns regarding the substantive
quality of intuitive decisions, there may be other reasons to reject
the “blink” model for sentencing. For instance, I have argued
elsewhere that procedural justice requires that sentences be
explained with a degree of rigor that is probably incompatible with
quick, intuitive decision making.126
In sum, notwithstanding the surprising power of unconscious
thinking in some contexts, the “blink” phenomenon seems no more
likely to supply a persuasive justification for appellate deference
than do the themes that are expressly invoked by the appellate
courts.
B. The Localization Account
Let us now consider another, more promising type of advantage
enjoyed by the trial judge: his or her background knowledge
regarding local circumstances in the courthouse and the community.
In explaining the relevance of local circumstances, it may be helpful
118. Id. at 16.
119. Guthrie et al., supra note 112, at 29-33.
120. See id.
121. See supra Part II.A.2.
122. See supra Part II.A.3.
123. Guthrie et al., supra note 112, at 31. 
124. O’Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts, supra note 92, at 466-67.
125. Guthrie et al., supra note 112, at 32.
126. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations, supra note 19, at 5-7.
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to distinguish among the different types of sentencing decisions
identified by Robinson and Spellman.127 First, consider policymak-
ing and policy articulation.128 Trial judges generally work and reside
in the communities in which they sentence defendants and so
probably tend to be better informed about local values and needs
regarding crime and punishment than the appellate judges above
them in the court system who serve much larger geographical
areas. If the trial judges are elected, of course, there is that much
greater reason to presume that the trial judges are in touch with,
and responsive to, community values and needs. At the policy level,
then, deference to trial judges may serve to adapt sentencing to suit
particular communities, in lieu of imposing a top-down, one-size-
fits-all approach.129 Thus, for instance, if one region in a state favors
rehabilitative approaches to punishment, and another favors
retributive, both can have their preferences satisfied. Or, if an
urban community thinks that unlicensed gun possession is an
extraordinarily dangerous and blameworthy crime, and a rural
community in the same state thinks that gun ownership is a
fundamental right and not appropriate for severe punishment,
appellate deference can help to ensure that sentencing practices in
both communities conform to local values.130
Knowledge of local circumstances also may be helpful with
respect to fact-finding decisions.131 The research on lie detection
shows that accuracy improves considerably when test subjects have
contextual knowledge from a source other than the witness whose
credibility is at issue.132 The trial judge’s independent knowledge of
the community may provide just such useful contextual information.
Such knowledge might help one to determine, for instance, whether
it is plausible that a street corner drug dealer in a particular
127. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
129. See Vincent L. Broderick, Local Factors in Sentencing, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 314, 314
(1993); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Localization and Transparency in Sentencing: Reflections
on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 357, 360-62 (2004).
130. Drawing on public choice theory, I have argued elsewhere that decentralization of
sentencing policy in areas where there is intense public disagreement, such as with drug
crimes, maximizes overall welfare over the long run (assuming that certain conditions, such
as spillover effects, are not present). Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57
VAND. L. REV. 783, 856-58 (2004) [hereinafter O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control]. 
131. See supra text accompanying note 37.
132. Minzner, supra note 62, at 2568.
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neighborhood has no gang affiliation, or whether it is believable that
poor road conditions, and not just the defendant’s recklessness,
contributed to a fatal car accident.
As we move to the final three types of decisions—judgment-
making, determining punishment amount, and determining pun-
ishment method133—knowledge of values in the local community
may still play a role, but knowledge of local courthouse circum-
stances also becomes important. For instance, in jurisdictions in
which it is customary for the prosecutor and/or defense lawyer to
offer sentencing recommendations, it may be helpful to know
something about the experience and reputation of the attorneys.
The attorneys may have private information of their own regarding
the circumstances of the defendant, victim, or community, and their
recommendations may reflect a thoughtful, well-informed, fine-
grained assessment of the case. But, absent prior experience with
the attorneys or knowledge of their reputations, it would be difficult
for an appellate judge to know which recommendations warrant
deference and which are better dismissed as empty posturing.
Sentencing recommendations from probation officers present a
similar set of issues. Once again, the private knowledge of trial
judges regarding the experience and reputation of particular
probation officers may give trial judges an important advantage
over appellate judges.134
Another potentially useful form of local knowledge is the pattern
of sentencing practices in a particular courthouse.135 The individual
judge will certainly have a feel for her own sentencing practices and
is likely also to know something about the sentencing practices of
133. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
134. Another potential advantage lies in the trial judge’s greater familiarity with the local
media. A trial judge is likely to have a much better sense of media interest in a case and how
different sentencing possibilities might be reported to the public. In this way, the trial judge
may be better positioned to ensure that sentences in high-profile cases satisfy public
preferences and do not result in a loss of public confidence in the criminal justice system. On
the other hand, although it seems desirable for sentences to conform generally to community
values, it is not clear that media interest in a particular case should affect the outcome.
Judicial catering to the media raises concerns about unwarranted sentencing disparities
depending on the presence of a reporter in the courtroom and the possibility of pandering to
a temporarily inflamed public opinion. See Broderick, supra note 129, at 315.
135. See David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, Judging Measures, 77 UMKC L. REV. 381, 409 (2008)
(recommending that sentencing data should be collected and provided to judges).
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other judges in the same courthouse.136 Such knowledge can help to
bring about a measure of uniformity within the courthouse. 
Finally, when it comes to determining method of punishment,
local knowledge regarding community-based sanctions may be of
great value. For purposes of designing a community-based sanction
or deciding that such a sanction is inappropriate, it is very helpful
to know the answers to such questions as: Does the local probation
office provide effective supervision? Are there good addiction
treatment options available in the community? What are the
offender’s prospects for obtaining good employment or useful
vocational training? What is the character of the neighborhood in
which the offender resides? 
In sum, the trial judge’s private knowledge of local circumstances
helps to fill in the gaps in the standard account of appellate
deference. By giving room for knowledge of local circumstances to be
brought to bear in the sentencing process, deference can lead to
better sentencing decisions, particularly in the sense that sentences
better reflect community values, the practice norms of particular
courthouses, and the availability of local resources to support
community-based sanctions. But recognizing this potential advan-
tage of deference does not necessarily mean that the sum total of
advantages and disadvantages ultimately favors deference. 
C. Assessing the Case for Deference
As suggested above, the appellate courts’ characterization of
sentencing as “difficult”137 and “arduous”138 points to one advantage
of deference: it reduces the appellate courts’ transaction costs. A
highly deferential approach discourages appeals, demands a less
rigorous review of the record when there is an appeal, and provides
a ready basis for summary rejection on the merits with little written
analysis. But, of course, transaction costs alone cannot justify
deference, for transaction costs could be minimized by treating all
136. Even if that information is not systematically collected and shared, the judges who
share a courthouse routinely talk amongst themselves and with the lawyers who practice in
front of them; such informal exchanges supply information about courthouse norms that is
less likely available to appellate judges.
137. People v. Babcock, 666 N.W.2d 231, 243 (Mich. 2003).
138. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002).
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lower court decisions deferentially. It may be that sentencing
decisions tend to be especially costly because of the number and
variety of factors that ought to be considered; but not all sentencing
records are thick. In busy courtrooms, judges often have little more
to go on than a charging document, a rap sheet, and a few brief in-
court statements from the defendant. In contrast, some “legal”
decisions themselves require review of many diverse texts—
consider, for instance, the complex weighing of arcane historical
sources that can go into originalist constitutional interpretation.139
Moreover, although every sentencing case is unique in some
respects, there are regularly recurring issues and fact patterns in
sentencing,140 such that an appellate court’s investment of effort in
clear, well-reasoned sentencing opinions could save transaction
costs in resolving future cases. Thus, although the transaction costs
argument may provide some support for deference, it hardly seems
a showstopper.141
On the other side, as described in Part I, legality values support
nondeferential review.142 To be sure, as suggested in the previous
Section, trial judges may deploy their knowledge of local sentencing
practices so as to mitigate the legality costs of deference.143 More
specifically, there are good reasons to suspect that interjudge
disparities within a given courthouse are less significant than
intercourthouse disparities. Empirical research, though limited,
provides some support for this proposition.144 But defendants from
139. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-82, 501-18, 525-29 (2000)
(discussing at length the significance of various eighteenth- and nineteenth-century treatises
and cases for the contemporary scope of the right to jury fact-finding beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal cases in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 78 F. Supp. 2d 189, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Marvin
Williams, the defendant, presents a picture that is all too familiar to any District Judge
sitting in an urban court.”).
141. Indeed, despite the redundant transaction costs, the courts of other nations sometimes
provide much broader de novo review than American courts. See, e.g., Susan F. Mandiberg,
Why Sentencing by a Judge Satisfies the Right to Jury Trial: A Comparative Look at Blakely
and Booker, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 107, 129 (2009) (noting that French appellate courts
provide de novo review of both factual and legal determinations).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
144. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 97-98 (2004)
(reporting that 12.7 percent of variation in sentence length in federal drug trafficking cases
is attributable to the city of prosecution, whereas the primary judge effect, reflecting random
assignment of a case to a judge within a district, explains only 1.64 percent of variation).
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many different courthouses are typically housed together in prison,
and those from harsher courthouses will still know and feel the
sting of the broader disparities. Moreover, the fact that the judges
within a courthouse may generally adhere to unwritten norms does
not address the fair notice concerns that also are encompassed by
legality. 
With transaction costs pointing in favor of deference and legality
concerns pointing against, decisional quality seems the most likely
tiebreaker. This is, in fact, the main point relied on by the appellate
courts, and when localization values are incorporated into the
quality argument, it is at least a plausible position. The trial judges
have private knowledge regarding local circumstances, and
appellate deference gives room for that knowledge to be brought to
bear. If we assume that the quality of a sentencing decision is in
large measure a function of its fine-grainedness—a function, that is,
of its sensitivity to a diverse range of facts and considerations that
are relevant to the blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct and
the appropriate societal response—then local knowledge does indeed
seem likely to contribute to decisional quality.
Yet, plausible though the localization theory may be, decisional
quality does not provide decisive support for deference either.
Indeed, a plausible theory can be advanced that appellate courts are
still better positioned than trial courts to reach high quality, fine-
grained sentencing decisions, notwithstanding their lesser knowl-
edge of local circumstances. Deference gives trial judges an opportu-
nity to bring helpful private information to bear, but does not assure
that they will do so. Instead, trial judges might place too much
reliance, consciously or unconsciously, on race and other irrelevant
visual cues, as the research on lie detection suggests is commonly
done.145 Likewise, trial judges tend to see a small number of lawyers
practicing in front of them repeatedly in criminal cases and might
consciously or unconsciously give too much weight to the recommen-
dations of repeat players with whom they wish to retain a good
working relationship. Moreover, as I have described in more detail
elsewhere, the order in which information is presented in the trial
court may tend to produce cognitive biases that lead sentencing
145. See supra Part II.A.3.
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judges to place too much emphasis on aggravating offense circum-
stances relative to mitigating offender circumstances.146 
While appellate judges are doubtless subject to various biases of
their own, it is not implausible that, on the whole, they are better
positioned to render fine-grained judgments based on a full con-
sideration of relevant offense and offender characteristics. I already
have noted that transcript-based decisions may be less prone to
distortion based on irrelevant visual cues than confrontation-based
decisions.147 More generally, group decision making, as is tradition-
ally employed at the appellate level, is better suited to decisions
that require taking multiple factors into account.148 Each member
of the group is able to act as a check on the tendency of the others
to overlook or downplay relevant information. With the aid of a
written record that can be read and reread in a reflective fashion,
appellate courts thus seem to have greater capacity than trial courts
to ensure that important information is not overwhelmed by strong
emotional or intuitive responses to just a small number of cues. This
cognitive advantage, though, may or may not be enough to outweigh
the trial court’s private information advantage: is it better to have
a decision maker with a greater quantity of relevant information, or
a decision maker better able to process its lesser amount of informa-
tion effectively?
In sum, we seem to be at an impasse. Transaction cost concerns
support deference, legality concerns point in the opposite direction,
and it is not clear which level of court has the decisional-quality
advantage.
III. THE SLIDING-SCALE APPROACH
The case for across-the-board appellate deference to trial court
sentencing decisions seems less than compelling. At the same time,
it is difficult to see a case for across-the-board de novo review that
is any stronger. To break the impasse, I propose in this Part a
sliding-scale approach to appellate review. Rather than a single,
146. The underlying psychological mechanisms are those that result in first-received
information being given more weight than later-received information. O’Hear, Appellate
Review of Sentence Explanations, supra note 19, at 10-12.
147. See supra Part II.A.3.
148. Robinson & Spellman, supra note 34, at 1146.
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across-the-board approach, appellate courts might review sentences
with greater or lesser rigor depending on the presence of certain
indicia that suggest the case for deference is especially strong or
weak. In this way, appellate courts might produce some of the
legality and decisional-quality benefits of more rigorous review, but
still avoid the added transaction costs of closer scrutiny in those
cases where the costs are least likely outweighed by the benefits.149
To be more specific, the “abuse of discretion” standard commonly
used for reviewing sentences has a flexibility that seems quite
capable of supporting different levels of deference in different
circumstances.150 I suggest here a default level of high deference
that is diminished to the extent that the transaction costs of closer
scrutiny are unusually low, the legality concerns of high deference
review are unusually compelling, or the localization benefits of
149. The approach I propose—strengthening appellate review to deal with legality concerns
but preserving considerable discretion at the trial court level—may appropriately be placed
in the context of longstanding calls for appellate courts to develop a common law of
sentencing. See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 7, at 1500 (“I adhere provisionally to the core of the
reformist vision that appellate judges should be encouraged to contribute in thoughtful,
precedential, and policy-informed ways to the growth of a substantive common law of
sentencing.”). For instance, in their much discussed 1998 proposal to reform federal
sentencing, Professor Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes wrote, 
[I]n determining how to constrain judges’ discretion in sentencing we should look
to the mechanism that has been used for centuries to impose such constraints
in most other judicial matters: requiring trial judges to give reasons for their
decisions, and then permitting litigants to seek review of those decisions in
appellate courts.... Slowly but surely, a federal common law of sentencing would
be created.
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 16, at 170. In criticizing their proposal, however, Professor
Frank Bowman has questioned whether the judiciary is really willing to do the work required
to develop a common law of sentencing. Frank O. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear
of Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 323
(2000). Given “too few federal judges and too many federal cases,” Bowman suggests that it
may be unrealistic to expect a “persuasive common law of federal sentencing” to arise. Id. at
356. My proposal may be thought of as a response to Bowman’s suggestion, and, by extension,
to state and federal appellate judges who share the view that they cannot realistically be
expected to devote a substantially greater share of their time to sentencing issues. It is
possible to identify a limited subset of cases that can be targeted on principled grounds for
closer review, without necessarily opening the floodgates to routine de novo review of
sentences.
150. See Lee, supra note 15, at 15, 19 (“Some appellate courts use a functional approach
to mixed question review, deciding on a case-by-case basis which judicial actor (district judge
or appellate judge) is more competent to decide the matter.... Given the wide divergence of
opinion as to the meaning of abuse of discretion, use of a functional approach similar to that
applied to mixed questions of fact and law has great appeal.”).
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deference are unusually weak. As detailed below, various indicia
can be identified that tend to signal that at least one of these
conditions is present.151 
A. Indicia of Low Transaction Costs
When an appellate court reviews a sentence, the court may be
confronted by a voluminous record from the lower court, including,
for instance, a trial transcript, a comprehensive presentence inves-
tigation report, written submissions from the parties, and a lengthy
sentencing hearing transcript.152 But the record need not be nearly
so extensive. A case might, for instance, move directly from guilty
plea to sentencing, without a presentence investigation report or
substantial presentations from the parties.153 Where the record is
relatively thin, of course, the appellate court absorbs minimal
transaction costs in fully reconsidering all of the information
presented to the sentencing judge, and deference is accordingly less
likely to be justified. 
In addition to cases in which there is only a meager record to
review, at least one other type of case would seem to present
attenuated transaction cost concerns. There are cases that involve
a commonly recurring issue that can be resolved through the
adoption of a general principle. In such cases, the appellate court’s
investment of effort to resolve the commonly recurring issue in a
clear, definitive fashion may save transaction costs over the long
run, as the issue will no longer need to be litigated at the trial or
appellate levels. On the other hand, if the issue is a matter as to
which different communities in the jurisdiction hold divergent and
strongly held beliefs—as might occur, for instance, in drug or gun
cases—then localization values may still warrant a high level of
deference. 
151. In formulating such indicia, of course, it is important to try to avoid numerous or
highly indeterminate criteria that would require substantial transaction costs to sort out even
before any analysis of the merits takes place.
152. See HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., THE PRACTICE OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE 485-526 (2006) (describing federal sentencing process and providing samples
of documents created in the process).
153. See supra note 111.
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B. Indicia of High Legality Concerns
Legality concerns focus on uniformity and fair notice.154 With
respect to uniformity, one indicator of concern is a sentence near the
very top or bottom of a wide sentencing range. If one assumes that
the most extreme sentences are generally reserved for the most
extreme cases, then the imposition of an extreme sentence might be
taken as a sign that the appellate court should take a careful look
to ensure that the case truly is an extreme one, and that the
sentence does not result instead from one judge’s highly idiosyn-
cratic response to the case. Similar logic would justify closer scru-
tiny of sentences far above or below a sentencing range recom-
mended by advisory guidelines.155
Likewise, a sentence to prison, as opposed to a shorter term of
incarceration in a local jail or another community-based sanction,
might trigger heightened legality concerns. More severe sentences
appropriately demand greater reassurance of their conformity to
rule-of-law values.156 Additionally, prisons generally aggregate
offenders from across regions within a jurisdiction; thus, prisoners
tend to be acutely aware of intercourthouse disparities, which can
undermine their perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system.157
Fair notice concerns arise when individual sentencing judges
follow idiosyncratic principles that are not generally known or
readily knowable. These concerns may be diminished to the extent
154. Huigens, supra note 11, at 1063.
155. To be sure, appellate courts may run afoul of defendants’ Sixth Amendment jury-trial
rights if close scrutiny of sentences outside recommended guidelines effectively transforms
advisory guidelines into mandatory guidelines. See supra note 4. However, the Supreme Court
has indicated that sentences far outside the range may permissibly be treated differently than
sentences closer to the range. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (“In reviewing
the reasonableness of a sentence outside the Guidelines range, appellate courts may therefore
take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the
Guidelines.”).
156. Cf. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations, supra note 19, at 57-58
(arguing that the relative importance of liberty interests at stake supports a robust
explanation requirement for sentences, especially when sentence length exceeds one year).
157. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 483, 486, 494 (1988) (discussing empirical research indicating that defendants’ views of
the fairness of the system are influenced by how their outcomes compared with those of other
defendants).
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that judges clearly articulate the principles on which their sentences
rest. The principles are then exposed for public discussion and
debate and stand a greater chance of dissemination beyond the
courthouse insiders who regularly practice in front of the judge.
Conversely, a Delphic sentence, imposed with a few cursory
references to the circumstances of the offense or the offender,
provides little reassurance that the defendant has had fair notice of
what really mattered in the selection of his sentence.158 For that
reason, a sentence that has been explained only in perfunctory or
generic terms might appropriately be subject to less deferential
review. 
C. Indicia of Weak Localization Benefits
If the case for higher decisional quality in the trial court rests on
localization values, then cases with weak localization benefits seem
relatively ill suited for highly deferential treatment. Thus, for
instance, the disposition of cases that are of significant concern
beyond the local community, such as the prosecution of the leaders
of a statewide drug trafficking enterprise or Ponzi scheme, seems
less appropriately subject to community-specific values than, say,
routine street crime.159 Likewise, a sentence that has been explained
only by reference to generic considerations and does not expressly
invoke local considerations provides a relatively weak case for
appellate deference. Indeed, given the tendency of public explana-
tion of decisions to attenuate the effects of some cognitive biases,
poorly explained sentences are more likely than others to be
influenced by the sorts of biases outlined in the previous Part.160
Reconsideration by a multijudge panel might make a significant
contribution to quality in such cases. Finally, complementing the
earlier suggestion that prison sentences are more likely to raise
important legality concerns, the rejection of community-based
158. The ancient oracle at Delphi offered famously inscrutable pronouncements. See
STRINGFELLOW BARR, THE WILL OF ZEUS: A HISTORY OF GREECE FROM THE ORIGINS OF
HELLENIC CULTURE TO THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER 81 (1961) (“Specific questions were likely
to elicit general answers or answers which ... wore an air of being specific yet irrelevant.”).
159. Cf. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, supra note 130, at 858-59 (discussing the
ability of spillover effects to overcome the general presumption in favor of decentralized
decision making indicated by the public-choice model of federalism). 
160. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations, supra note 19, at 13-14.
2010] APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 2163
sanctions means that searching appellate review is less likely to
sacrifice the benefits of the sentencing judge’s private knowledge of
community supervision and rehabilitation resources.
D. Recap and Illustration
To summarize, the following indicia suggest that the normally
high levels of deference shown to sentencing decisions might be
appropriately adjusted to provide for more searching appellate
review:
• Thin record of sentencing related information developed in trial
court
• Presence of commonly recurring sentencing question not
previously resolved by appellate court
• Sentence near very top or bottom of wide statutory sentencing
range
• Prison term imposed
• Perfunctory or generic explanation of sentence, especially if no
reference made to local particularities
• Offense directly affected larger geographical area than judicial
district in which sentencing occurred.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that any precise formula
should govern the consideration of these indicia. Rather, the idea is
that the presence of multiple indicia, or perhaps even just one in
some cases, should lead to a less deferential stance than normal by
the appellate court. Where the indicia are present in an unusually
strong way, then the review might appropriately be in the nature of
de novo reconsideration of the sentence.
Although the sliding-scale approach I propose differs from the
across-the-board, high deference typically accorded sentencing
decisions, aspects of my approach are occasionally reflected in the
existing case law. A good example is the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
opinion in McCleary v. State.161 
In McCleary, the sentencing judge imposed an indeterminate
prison term of up to nine years on a check forger with no prior
criminal history.162 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found this to be
161. 182 N.W.2d 512 (Wis. 1971).
162. Id. at 516.
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an abuse of discretion163 and reduced the sentence to five years.164
Although the court’s decision was not systematically theorized, the
court emphasized various aspects of the case that resonate with the
indicia described above: the record was thin,165 the sentence was
nearly at the top of the ten-year statutory range,166 a prison term
was imposed,167 and only a perfunctory explanation was given for
the sentence.168
Another aspect of the court’s analysis also resonates with the
sliding-scale approach. As discussed in the previous Part, one good
reason for appellate judges to defer to trial judges is that trial
judges often have extensive experience with the different probation
officers who work in their courthouses, and will thus better be able
to assess the weight that should be given to individual probation
officers’ observations and recommendations.169 The sentencing judge
in McCleary did indeed rely on a probation officer’s report and
recommendation.170 But this particular probation officer was a “new
and inexperienced caseworker, who had, according to the record, no
prior experience or training in probation work.”171 The record thus
happened to make clear that the sentencing judge was not drawing
on private knowledge that the probation officer had a good track
record, but was instead either following a general policy of deferring
163. Id. at 522.
164. Id. at 526.
165. See id. at 515 (noting that sentencing hearing “afforded the defendant no opportunity
to offer any proof in contravention of facts set forth in the presentence report and [did not]
afford[ ] the defendant the right of allocution”); id. at 524 (“In the instant case, only six pages
of the record in the first sentencing were devoted to the testimony of McCleary. It may well
be doubted that, on the basis of such brief appearance before the court, any observations could
be made that would justify [the] sentence [initially imposed].”).
166. See id. at 514 (noting the ten-year maximum); id. at 524 (“We are satisfied that in the
instant case there is no evidence that judicial discretion was exercised in a manner that
justifies a near-maximum sentence.”).
167. See id. at 516.
168. See id. (“[T]he judge’s reasons for imposing the nine-year sentence were extremely
brief.”); id. at 522 (“The problem in the instant case arises because the trial judge failed to
give his reasons why a lengthy, near-maximum sentence was appropriate.”).
169. See supra Part II.B.
170. See McCleary, 182 N.W.2d at 515 (noting that at the sentencing hearing “the trial
judge read without comment portions of the presentence report,” and quoting trial judge as
saying “‘I intend to follow the recommendation of the Probation Department’”); id. at 523
(“From this report the trial judge apparently drew the conclusion that the defendant had a
[Nietzschean] attitude and considered himself above the law.”).
171. Id. at 522.
2010] APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 2165
to probation officers or deciding that the content of the probation
officer’s report was sufficiently compelling to warrant deference in
the case at hand. Either way, the sentencing judge was in no better
position than the appellate judges to determine how much weight
ought to be given to the probation officer’s report. The appellate
judges could reach their own, de novo conclusion as to that question
without fear of losing the benefit of any private local knowledge.
And the appellate judges did indeed determine that too much weight
had been given to the probation officer’s report.172
None of this is to say that McCleary expressly adopted the
proposed sliding-scale approach to deference. Indeed, the opinion is
frustratingly vague in a number of respects, such as how the court’s
critique of the probation officer’s work fits into the broader legal
analysis. But McCleary does suggest that some of the basic concerns
underlying the sliding-scale proposal have been shared by the
justices of at least one state supreme court.
CONCLUSION
Since at least the time of Judge Frankel’s pathbreaking work in
the early 1970s,173 the legal scholarship on sentencing has been
dominated by the guidelines-versus-discretion debate. Ultimately,
the debate can have no resolution because each side’s position rests
on incommensurate values and uncertain empirical assumptions.
Guidelines proponents invoke rule-of-law values, while opponents
point out that no system of sentencing rules can ever hope to give a
proper, morally defensible weight to every sentencing factor in every
case. Proponents think that guidelines can get enough of the cases
right that discretion can be kept low, while opponents argue that
every defendant is a unique human being who is entitled to be
considered as such. It seems reasonably clear that mandatory
guidelines inevitably result in some cases being handled in a more
clumsy fashion than would be done by a judge given wide discretion
to pursue fine-grained sentencing. But the frequency of such cases
is unknown and perhaps unknowable. Nor is it clear how to weigh
172. See id. at 523 (“This writer ... is of the opinion that the philosopher-probation agent
was overzealous in attempting to make his past educational experience pertinent to his new
job.”).
173. See FRANKEL, supra note 1.
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the fine-grainedness costs of such cases against the legality and
other costs of a highly discretionary system. In the end, the
guidelines debate breaks down into a question of where the burden
of proof is placed, with some preferring to err on the side of rule-of-
law values and others preferring to err on the side of ensuring the
possibility of fine-grained sentences tailored to the full range of
offense and offender characteristics.
With so much attention focused on the ultimately inconclusive
guidelines debate, scholars and policymakers have neglected the
role of appellate courts in the sentencing process—except insofar as
the appellate courts police guidelines compliance. This neglect is
unfortunate because robust appellate review of sentences may
present the best hope for accommodating both legality and fine-
grainedness values. Appellate courts are able to identify and correct
outlier sentences, with their decisions then becoming shared
benchmarks for lower courts. Appellate courts are also able to
develop general rules over time in the areas of policymaking and
policy articulation. But, unlike sentencing commissions, appellate
courts are not limited to ex ante rulemaking and can adapt general
rules and distinguish precedents on a case-by-case basis to ensure
that sentences take into account all relevant offense and offender
characteristics in a fine-grained way.
But stronger appellate review must overcome longstanding
traditions of deference, at least outside the minority of states with
binding sentencing guidelines. Fortunately, legal scholars and
lawyers are becoming increasingly knowledgeable about the
psychological research on cognition, which casts much doubt on the
familiar grounds given by appellate courts for deference. On the
other hand, a stronger argument for deference can be made by
reference to transaction costs and sentencing judges’ background
knowledge of local circumstances. This argument seemingly leads
to another impasse.
In order to get around the impasse, I suggest a sliding-scale
approach to deference, with appellate review growing more robust
to the extent that the transaction costs are low, the legality benefits
high, or at least the likelihood of losing the benefits of local
knowledge low. Various indicia can be used to help identify when
low deference conditions are present. 
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It is true that the sliding-scale proposal contemplates more work
for appellate courts. But the uniquely important interests at stake
in criminal punishment surely warrant more thoughtful appellate
treatment than is indicated by the repeated invocation of generic
clichés about the value of demeanor evidence and the experience of
trial judges.

